Simulated: the attacker, the resource server, the tenants, and the clock are fake. No real service is involved.
Try this
- Leave all defenses off. Press Vendor credential stolen. Count the FALLEN tiles.
- Turn on the purpose claim. Press the button again. Read the server replies in the chat.
- Turn on tenant approval too. Compare the results in the list below the grid.
The incident behind this demo
Per public reports, dated 2026-10-21: Microsoft wrote that the group Storm-0940 abused an app credential from ConnectWise Cloud Backup. The app held Directory.ReadWrite.All by customer consent. Microsoft says more than 2,250 tenants had sign-in attempts. Huntress says about 300 had unauthorized access.
The 30 tiles below are a toy sample. They do not map to real tenants.
Tenants
Each tile shows a text status: FALLEN (admin access gained), HELD (waits for the tenant admin), or BLOCKED.
Results of your runs
Attacker's agent and the resource server
What the resource server sees
Purpose catalog (a proposal)
Timeline (simulated clock)
Where the check happens
Logos are trademarks of their owners. They only name the product. These demos are simulated and do not mean any company endorses or takes part in them.
Pain point
One stolen vendor credential can open thousands of customer tenants.
Problem statement
Many customers accept the same vendor credential, and vendors often ask for broad scopes. A thief who steals it reaches every tenant.
What sparked it
A reported 2026-10-21 incident involved ConnectWise Cloud Backup and Storm-0940. Per public reports, about 300 tenants had unauthorized access.
Why this approach
Each grant names a purpose class, such as backup read. The resource server checks it on each use.
Hypothesis tested
We believed that a purpose check on each use limits the damage of a stolen credential. If it holds, a backup credential cannot reach beyond backup reads.
How to try it
- Open the Prototype tab. Press Vendor credential stolen with all defenses off.
- Turn on defense 1, then press the button again.
- Turn on defenses 2 and 3. Read the chat and the timeline.
- Press Play on the diagram.
What this does not do
- It talks to no real service, attacker, or agent.
- A stolen credential can still read backups on every tenant.
- It does not show how an identity provider signs a purpose claim.
Sources
- Microsoft Security blog, 2026-10-21.
- OAuth RFC 9396 defines no purpose vocabulary. The catalog here is a proposal.
Notes
- Who would pay: managed service providers and cyber insurers (assumption).
- First customer: a managed service provider with hundreds of small tenants.
- Closest alternative: fine-grained scopes per purpose.
- Weak spot: teams must agree on a purpose catalog.
- Feedback: who would write and own the purpose catalog?
Traces
| Step | Prompt | Model | Tool | Date |
|---|
Cost
| Step | Model | Input tokens | Output tokens | Cost (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | ||||
Measured: the author runs used 119,913 tokens in total. Estimated: the split into input and output tokens (90 percent input, 10 percent output) and the dollar cost, at $2 input and $10 output per million tokens for Sonnet 5.5 (about $0.34). The run reported one total only. The lead session's planning, research, and publishing are not included. The prompts in the Traces section are listed in the order they were given.