Purpose-Bound Grant

Simulated: the attacker, the resource server, the tenants, and the clock are fake. No real service is involved.

Try this

  1. Leave all defenses off. Press Vendor credential stolen. Count the FALLEN tiles.
  2. Turn on the purpose claim. Press the button again. Read the server replies in the chat.
  3. Turn on tenant approval too. Compare the results in the list below the grid.

The incident behind this demo

Per public reports, dated 2026-10-21: Microsoft wrote that the group Storm-0940 abused an app credential from ConnectWise Cloud Backup. The app held Directory.ReadWrite.All by customer consent. Microsoft says more than 2,250 tenants had sign-in attempts. Huntress says about 300 had unauthorized access.

The 30 tiles below are a toy sample. They do not map to real tenants.

Defenses

Tenants

    Each tile shows a text status: FALLEN (admin access gained), HELD (waits for the tenant admin), or BLOCKED.

    Results of your runs

      Attacker's agent and the resource server

      What the resource server sees

      
                    

      Purpose catalog (a proposal)

      
                  

      Timeline (simulated clock)

        Where the check happens

        The purpose check An attacker calls a resource server with a stolen grant. The server compares the purpose on the grant with the purpose of the call. A backup read passes to the tenant data. A role assignment is blocked and the tenant admin gets a request. AttackerResource server Tenant dataTenant admin stolen grant checks purpose backup read: ok role assign: blocked gets a request

        Logos are trademarks of their owners. They only name the product. These demos are simulated and do not mean any company endorses or takes part in them.

        Pain point

        One stolen vendor credential can open thousands of customer tenants.

        Problem statement

        Many customers accept the same vendor credential, and vendors often ask for broad scopes. A thief who steals it reaches every tenant.

        What sparked it

        A reported 2026-10-21 incident involved ConnectWise Cloud Backup and Storm-0940. Per public reports, about 300 tenants had unauthorized access.

        Why this approach

        Each grant names a purpose class, such as backup read. The resource server checks it on each use.

        Hypothesis tested

        We believed that a purpose check on each use limits the damage of a stolen credential. If it holds, a backup credential cannot reach beyond backup reads.

        How to try it

        1. Open the Prototype tab. Press Vendor credential stolen with all defenses off.
        2. Turn on defense 1, then press the button again.
        3. Turn on defenses 2 and 3. Read the chat and the timeline.
        4. Press Play on the diagram.

        What this does not do

        Sources

        Notes

        Traces

        Prompts used to make this prototype
        StepPromptModelToolDate

        Cost

        Cost to make this prototype
        StepModelInput tokensOutput tokensCost (USD)
        Total

        Measured: the author runs used 119,913 tokens in total. Estimated: the split into input and output tokens (90 percent input, 10 percent output) and the dollar cost, at $2 input and $10 output per million tokens for Sonnet 5.5 (about $0.34). The run reported one total only. The lead session's planning, research, and publishing are not included. The prompts in the Traces section are listed in the order they were given.