Simulated: one made-up token, a fake clock, and made-up delays. Nothing here talks to a real service or agent. The delays do not describe how any company works.
One token is revoked. Who still trusts it?
An issuer revokes a leaked token. Press Play or Step and watch the notice spread to each app.
Alert feed
Revocation feed (live)
Every consumer
| Consumer | How it learns | Status | Kept trusting | Exposure window |
|---|
The Today delays are made up. They show the shape of the problem, not a measurement.
Try this
- Keep "Today" selected. Press Step four times. Read the alert feed.
- Choose "With a shared feed". Press Play and compare the worst exposure window.
- Add a consumer that ignores the feed. Press Play and see who never drops the grant.
Pain point
A broken key or token stays trusted in each app until someone tells that app.
Problem statement
Apps drop a revoked grant at different times. Each gap is a window where the broken key still works. No shared signal tells every app to stop at once.
What sparked it
Per public reports, vendors blocked the eMudhra keys at different times between Oct 17 and Oct 20 2026.
Why this approach
An issuer publishes one signed notice to a shared feed. Every subscriber acts on it, and the page shows who has not.
Hypothesis tested
We believed that a shared revocation feed shortens the time apps keep trusting a broken key. If it holds, the worst exposure window drops in feed mode.
How to try it
- Open the Prototype tab. Press Step with "Today" selected.
- Select "With a shared feed" and press Play.
- Compare the worst exposure window in both modes.
- Add a consumer that ignores the feed and press Play again.
What this does not do
- It does not sign or check any notice.
- The consumers and the Today delays are made up, not measured.
- It does not show what happens when the feed itself is wrong.
Notes
- Who would pay: identity providers and SaaS security vendors.
- First customer: a security team that already tracks leaked tokens.
- Weak spot: consumers can ignore the feed.
- Feedback: who would run the feed, and who would you trust to run it?
Traces
| Step | Prompt | Model | Tool | Date |
|---|
Cost
| Step | Model | Input tokens | Output tokens | Cost (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | ||||
Measured: the author runs used 196,175 tokens in total. Estimated: the split into input and output tokens (90 percent input, 10 percent output) and the dollar cost, at $2 input and $10 output per million tokens for Sonnet 5.5 (about $0.55). The run reported one total only. The lead session's planning, research, and publishing are not included. The prompts in the Traces section are listed in the order they were given.