The problem
Today a site can mostly allow traffic, block it, or challenge it. Increasingly, bots and automation are being treated as hostile to the web and websites. An agent that doesn't say what it is looks the same as one that does, and so bot-ness is inferred from behavior rather than an explicit declaration. In cases where bots or automation are blocked, declaration is disincentivized. For site-holders, the drawbacks (e.g. declincing real user visits) have begun to outweigh the benefits (e.g. discovery by services like Google or ChatGPT) of allowing any bots, crawlers or other types.
The idea
Incentivized declaration. A visitor that declares what it is, a person or a bot, gets more than one that stays silent. An undisclosed visitor is heavily rate-limited or blocked, which is cheap for the site to do. A disclosed one gets access shaped to what it is.
The owner sets this up as a simple flow, like a workflow builder, and the rules are enforced at the edge. The blanket rate limiting aims to incentivize declaration and reduce the cost of undeclared bot traffic.
The policy model
- Kind of visitor. Undisclosed, person, or bot. The kind decides the surface: pages for a person, WebMCP functions for a bot.
- Access point. A tier of content for a person (free content, all content), or a function for a bot (
search,get_latest, and so on). - Requirement. Each access point has exactly one requirement: free, payment, or work. A function that accepts two kinds, for example pay or work, has two paths, one for each.
A requirement is a card that holds exactly one item, such as "Subscription, $1.00" or "Check 3 claims, size M". Two access points can point at the same card. For example, a person's "All content" and a bot's subscribe both point at the Subscription card. A card never lists more than one item, so each item stays something that can be configured, changed, and counted on its own.
People and bots are treated the same way: each gets access, and each access has one requirement.
Who pays
Payment is settled by the wallet, from the visitor's own funds or from a sponsored allowance. An institution can fund access for a student, or for a journalist, with a spending limit that can be capped for one agent and topped up for another. The site only sees a payment that settles. It doesn't need to know who funded it, so a student or a journalist needs no special case in the policy. The details of allowances belong to the mandate illustration (1c).
The wallet's part
The wallet supplies the proof of personhood, humanity, or liveness. The visitor doesn't need to do anything on the site. Because the wallet holds the proof, it can stay valid for a period the owner sets, so it isn't repeated site by site. The owner chooses which proof to require and how long it stays valid.
The card types
| Card | What it carries | In the illustration |
|---|---|---|
| Disclosure | What the visitor declares, and which proof is required | Undisclosed, person, bot |
| Outcome | A result with no further steps | Rate-limited |
| Person | Access points for a person, by tier | Free content, All content |
| Bot | Access points for a bot: its WebMCP functions and what each accepts | search, get_latest, subscribe, spend_article_credit |
| Free | One item: no exchange | No exchange |
| Payment | One item: an amount, settled by the wallet | Subscription ($1.00), Per call ($0.02), Per article (1 credit) |
| Work | One item: a sized task with a description | Check 3 claims (M), Tag 5 photos (S) |
What an owner would do
In a real builder, an owner would add a step, pick a proof and its validity period, and attach a requirement to each access point. Enforcing it at the edge means the gate in front of the site checks the visitor's proof before anything else is served. The illustration shows the result and not the editor: the edit icons and "Add step" rows on the cards are only styling.
What the illustration leaves out
- It is static and simulated. There are no real proofs, no real gate, and no real wallet. Nothing can be edited or tested.
- How the site is structured to more efficiently handle increased request. The support increased bot traffic sites would likely need to be redesigned architecturally to be more efficiently used at the increased scale.
- How a person reads a page Here a person just gets the content their tier allows.
- The work board. A work card shows a size and a description. Illustration 1b shows what sits behind it.
- The mandate and allowances. Illustration 1c shows the agent owner's budgets.
- The handshake in which the site states what it accepts and the wallet answers with the least it can belongs to the wallet illustration.
- Specific protocols such as AP2, TAP, Web Bot Auth, and PACT are not reproduced.
Open questions
The gate
Who manages the gate: the site, a CDN (e.g. Cloudflare), or a third party (e.g. Mozilla)? A site running its own gate keeps control but has to build and maintain it. A CDN already sits in front of the traffic and can enforce at scale, but then the site depends on it for policy. A shared third party could make rules consistent across sites, at the cost of one more party that sees the traffic.
Proofs
Which proofs count (personhood, humanity, liveness), and can one be reused across sites without tracking the visitor? Reuse is what makes the wallet worth having, because the visitor proves it once. But a proof that is identical everywhere can also act as a tracking identifier. The design needs a way to show the proof is valid without handing every site the same token.
False declarations
How is one handled, such as a bot claiming to be a person? The incentive to declare only works if declaring falsely doesn't pay. Options include liveness checks that are hard for software, behavioral signals at the gate, and penalties that fall on the wallet that issued the false claim. Each trades some privacy or friction for accuracy.
Undisclosed
What exactly does an undisclosed visitor get: how limited, and is it the same for every site? A strict limit pushes visitors to declare, but it also catches legitimate visitors who can't or won't, such as people without a wallet. Each site will want its own balance, and a standard default would make behavior predictable for visitors.
Issuers
Who counts as a trusted issuer of humanity proofs and of sponsored allowances? A site has to decide which issuers it accepts, and that is a trust question that someone has to maintain, like a list of certificate authorities. A role for a neutral party such as Mozilla is one possibility. The alternative is each site keeping its own list, which is flexible but hard for visitors to predict.
Allowances
How is an allowance capped for one agent and topped up for another? A sponsor wants limits so one agent can't spend a whole budget, and wants to be able to move funds to where they're needed. That means the allowance needs a cap per agent and a way to re-fund it without issuing a new credential. The mandate illustration (1c) is where these budgets are shown.
A shared format
Should there be a standard format for these policies, so a bot can read them the same way on every site? A shared format would let a bot discover what a site accepts without custom code for each one, much as a standard certificate format does for HTTPS. The cost is agreeing on it, and a format that is too rigid may not fit the policies sites actually want.