Declare to read
An agent signs its request with a key. The site checks the signature and serves the correct text if it passes, or an encoded decoy if it doesn't. A person's browser sends no signature, and the font draws the correct page for them anyway. Pick a requester below and watch what each kind of reader gets.
Canned version. Every request, verdict and page below was recorded from the real prototype server, one run per case, and is replayed here, so nothing needs to be running. The reader panels are worked out in your browser from the recorded HTML. Section 3 differs: the live version draws the decoy page with the Shield font, and this one shows the finished rendering instead, since the font is not redistributed here.
1. The request and the server's verdict
2. What the server sends (the HTML on the wire)
3. What a person sees, and what a screenshot captures
In the live version, when the page is the decoy lane, it is drawn with the Shield font, which turns the decoy words back into the real ones on screen. Here you see that finished picture. A person reading in a browser sends no signature, so they are in the decoy lane and see this page. A vision agent that screenshots the page sees the same picture. This is left as-is on purpose.
4. What each kind of reader gets from that same page
Red words differ from the page's real text. The accessibility-tree panel approximates a browser's tree by skipping aria-hidden content.
5. How the server decides
- The request carries
Signature-Input(what was signed, a creation and expiry time, a one-time nonce, and a key id) andSignature. - The signed text includes the host and the path, so a signature made for one page fails on another.
- The server finds the public key. If the key id is in the site's own list, the requester is verified. If not, the requester may send its key with the request, and the site's policy decides whether to accept an anonymous key it has never seen.
- It checks the signature, the time window, and that the nonce hasn't been used before.
- Pass: plain HTML. Anything else: the encoded page and the font.
The site decides both whom to list and whether to accept unlisted keys. A signature proves the requester controls a key. It does not prove who they are or that they behave honestly.
6. Measured with real browsers (Playwright, headless Chromium)
| Channel | Undeclared or old header | Registered or throwaway key |
|---|---|---|
| HTTP fetch | 61% of words, 1 of 6 facts | 100%, 6 of 6 |
DOM innerText | 61%, 1 of 6 | 100%, 6 of 6 |
Accessibility tree (no aria-hidden) | 61%, 1 of 6 | 100%, 6 of 6 |
| Copy-paste | 61%, 1 of 6 | 100%, 6 of 6 |
| Screenshot | Correct text | Correct text |
With aria-hidden on the decoy blocks, the accessibility-tree row for undeclared drops to 3% and 0 of 6. The percentages in section 4 differ slightly from this table because they use a different word-matching method.
7. What this does not cover
Encoding and font: Shield Font (@shieldfont/core and @shieldfont/font 0.3.5, alpha mapping). The signed-declaration gate is added by this harness. It is RFC 9421-shaped (covers @authority and @path, Ed25519) but is not a conformant implementation, and the unlisted key travels in a nonstandard header in place of fetching a key directory.