Simulated: the vendor server, the log, and both clients run in this page. No network is used.
Try this
- Press "Publish update v1.0.1". The log gets a new entry.
- Press "Attacker swaps config for 5 minutes". Move the minute slider to 5.
- Press "Tamper with an old entry", then "Verify chain".
1. Vendor server
Config at this minute:
- url
- sha256
2. Public log (hash chain)
Each block hash is SHA-256 of the previous hash, the version, and the manifest hash. Hashes show 8 characters. A broken link shows in red with the word BROKEN.
Mirrors and watchers that can hold a copy of the log (examples only):
- Cloudflare, CDN mirror
- Akamai, CDN mirror
- Fastly, CDN mirror
- GitHub, public copy and watcher
- Firefox, example client host
- Google Chrome, example client host
3. Clients check at this minute
Old client (trusts the config)
Logged client (checks the log)
4. Live view
What the logged client checks
Event feed
How it works
Logos are trademarks of their owners. They only name the product. These demos are simulated and do not mean any company endorses or takes part in them.
Pain point
A software update swap that lasts only five minutes is easy to hide.
Problem statement
Attackers changed update config files on vendor servers for 5 to 10 minutes, then restored them. The client did not authenticate those files.
What sparked it
The AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer case, per public reports published on Oct 19 and 20 2026.
Why this approach
Record every update manifest in a public, append-only log. A client applies an update only if its manifest is in the log.
Hypothesis tested
We believed that a client that checks the log refuses a swapped manifest. If it holds, the checking client refuses the swap and the trusting client accepts it.
How to try it
- Open the Prototype tab. Press "Publish update v1.0.1".
- Press "Attacker swaps config for 5 minutes".
- Move the minute slider. Compare the two clients.
- Press "Tamper with an old entry", then "Verify chain".
What this does not do
- It does not run a real server, a real log, or a real witness.
- It does not stop an attacker who also controls the log.
- It checks only that a manifest is public, not that it is safe.
Notes
- Who would pay: software vendors with a self-update client, and endpoint security teams (assumption).
- First customer: a vendor with a self-update client, such as a backup tool.
- Weak spot: clients need a code change.
- Feedback: who should run the witness: the vendor, Mozilla, or a third party?
Traces
| Step | Prompt | Model | Tool | Date |
|---|
Cost
| Step | Model | Input tokens | Output tokens | Cost (USD) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total | ||||
Measured: the author runs used 184,112 tokens in total. Estimated: the split into input and output tokens (90 percent input, 10 percent output) and the dollar cost, at $2 input and $10 output per million tokens for Sonnet 5.5 (about $0.52). The run reported one total only. The lead session's planning, research, and publishing are not included. The prompts in the Traces section are listed in the order they were given.