Update Transparency Log

Simulated: the vendor server, the log, and both clients run in this page. No network is used.

Try this

  1. Press "Publish update v1.0.1". The log gets a new entry.
  2. Press "Attacker swaps config for 5 minutes". Move the minute slider to 5.
  3. Press "Tamper with an old entry", then "Verify chain".

1. Vendor server

Config at this minute:

url
sha256

2. Public log (hash chain)

Each block hash is SHA-256 of the previous hash, the version, and the manifest hash. Hashes show 8 characters. A broken link shows in red with the word BROKEN.

    Mirrors and watchers that can hold a copy of the log (examples only):

    • Cloudflare, CDN mirror
    • Akamai, CDN mirror
    • Fastly, CDN mirror
    • GitHub, public copy and watcher
    • Firefox, example client host
    • Google Chrome, example client host

    3. Clients check at this minute

    Old client (trusts the config)

    Logged client (checks the log)

    4. Live view

    What the logged client checks

      Event feed

      How it works

      Update transparency log diagram A vendor server adds each update manifest to a public log. A witness watches the log. A client fetches the config from the vendor and checks the log. The swap happens at the vendor server. The check that catches it happens at the client. Play, Step, and Reset buttons walk through the five steps. Vendor server Public log Client Witness 1 add manifest 2 witness watches 3 fetch config 4 is it logged? 5 CHECK HERE: refuse if the manifest is not logged SWAP HERE: config changes for 5 minutes

      Logos are trademarks of their owners. They only name the product. These demos are simulated and do not mean any company endorses or takes part in them.

      Pain point

      A software update swap that lasts only five minutes is easy to hide.

      Problem statement

      Attackers changed update config files on vendor servers for 5 to 10 minutes, then restored them. The client did not authenticate those files.

      What sparked it

      The AOMEI Backupper and AnyViewer case, per public reports published on Oct 19 and 20 2026.

      Why this approach

      Record every update manifest in a public, append-only log. A client applies an update only if its manifest is in the log.

      Hypothesis tested

      We believed that a client that checks the log refuses a swapped manifest. If it holds, the checking client refuses the swap and the trusting client accepts it.

      How to try it

      1. Open the Prototype tab. Press "Publish update v1.0.1".
      2. Press "Attacker swaps config for 5 minutes".
      3. Move the minute slider. Compare the two clients.
      4. Press "Tamper with an old entry", then "Verify chain".

      What this does not do

      Notes

      Traces

      Prompts used to make this prototype
      StepPromptModelToolDate

      Cost

      Cost to make this prototype
      StepModelInput tokensOutput tokensCost (USD)
      Total

      Measured: the author runs used 184,112 tokens in total. Estimated: the split into input and output tokens (90 percent input, 10 percent output) and the dollar cost, at $2 input and $10 output per million tokens for Sonnet 5.5 (about $0.52). The run reported one total only. The lead session's planning, research, and publishing are not included. The prompts in the Traces section are listed in the order they were given.